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Article 4

THE UNIT OPERATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDSt
PART

I.

VOLUNTARY UNIT OPERATION'

I.
General Application of Anti-Trust Legislation
With the demonstration of the validity of the engineering
concept that the management, operation and development
of a field or pool as a unit increases production and lessens
waste, the oil and gas industry evinced a desire to perfect
agreements which would bring about the voluntary operation of the geologic unit as an operational unit.' In the path
t This is the first of two installments of this article. The second will appear
in the Summer Issue of Volume XXVII of the Notre Dame Lawyer. [Editor's
note.]
1 The expression "unit operation" is used throughout as synonymous with
unit operation or cooperative development. A unit project is: "A project for the
efficient management, development, and operation as a single, consolidated
property, of two or more leases within a pool, or pyprtion thereof, for the
prevention of waste, the promotion of conservation, and increasing the recovery
of oil, gas, natural gasoline, and associated hydrocarbons, by the drilling of wells
with regard to reservoir conditions and structure, rather than man-made lease
boundaries on the surface, and for the sharing of obligation and benefit so
incurred, and of the oil and other product so produced on some equitable basis
defined in the project or plan." A cooperative project is: "A project for the more
efficient, more scientific development and operation of two or more leases within
a pool, or portion thereof, for the prevention of waste, and for greater ultimate
recovery of oil, gas, natural gasoline, and associated hydrocarbons, by individually
developing and operating the separate ownerships, and retaining to the separate
ownerships the oil, gas, natural gasoline, and associated hydrocarbons produced
therefrom." Pamphlet of the Research and Coordinating Committee, Interstate
Oil Compact Commission, Unitized and Cooperative Projects in the United States
I (May 1950). Unit or cooperative projects have been formed for: (a) secondary
recovery operations, that is, gas repressuring and waterflooding, or for the purpose
of carrying on pressure maintenance operations through injection of gas, water,
or other substances into the producing formation; (b) cycling operations in
connection with gas-distillate pools; (c) compliance with state or federal requirements, that is, under regulations of the Petroleum Administration for War, and
of state regulatory agencies which relate to minimum spacing of wells; (d) underground natural gas storage reservoirs for natural gas transmission systems; and,
(e) operations in wildcat or semi-wildcat territory prior to the drilling of the
first well. See HARDwICKE, ANTITRUST LAWS ET AL v- UNIT OPERATION or OIL OR
GAS POOLS 191 (1948); Publication of the Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Asssociation,
HANDBOOK ON UNITIZATION OF OIL Poors 15 (1930).
2 Kaveler, The Engineering Basis for and the Results from the Unit Operation
of Oil Pools, 23 Tur.,AN L. REv. 331 (1949); HAmDwci,
op. cit. supra note 1,
(405)
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of this interest there were obstacles which had to be cleared
away. The principal fear was that there might be a violation
of the state or federal statutes relating to monopolies, trusts
and restraints of trade. The practical difficulty in securing
the consent of numerous and varied owners of oil and gas
rights to an agreement- presented another real stumbling
block in those areas where these rights were widely dispersed.' Many questions of interpretation as to the effect of
unilateral voluntary agreements between lessees upon the
express or implied covenants of their oil and gas leases were
posed.
Unit operation requires joint activity on the part of those
interested in the operation and development of a field or
pool as a unit, or as a cooperative project. It is not necessary
that the oil produced, or any gas, distillate, or condensate
be jointly refined or marketed. It is necessary that the liquid
hydrocarbons be extracted from the gas and that they be
separated into the usable constituents of liquid hydrocarbons
by joint processing to realize the benefits of the unit or
cooperative management. The very purpose of the unit
operation may be the cycling of natural gas to recover
additional hydrocarbons. In that event the extraction and
separation of these hydrocarbons cannot be efficiently carried out independently by those owning the right to produce
in the unit area.
at 35-107, 119-156; Hearings before House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce on H. Res. 290 and H.R. 7372 (Conservation of Petroleum and
Creation of an Office of Petroleum Conservation), 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 485-8
(1939).
3 Dobson v. Arkansas Oil & Gas Commission, 218 Ark. 160, 235 S.W. (2d)
33 (1950). The proponents of unit operation in the Dobson case had secured the
signatures of ninety-seven percent of the operators and seventy-five percent of the
royalty owners to the unit plan of operation at the time the petition was filed.
At the time the case came to trial the contract had been signed by all of the
operators and by ninety-six percent of the royalty owners. Those who had not
signed had an interest of .003004 percent of the total oil and gas which might
be produced in the field. See Mahony, Arkansas, in A LEGAL REPORT OF OrL AND
GAS CONSERVATION FOR THE YEAR 1950 2 (Murphy ed. 1951).
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A. Voluntary Unit Operation in Those States Which
Have No Statutes Expressly Permitting Voluntary
Unit Operation or Cooperative Development: '
An agreement between lessors, lessees and royalty owners
for the unit or cooperative operation, development, or management of private lands in a cooperative or unit area is
valid, absent a violation of state or federal anti-trust legislation. It is generally believed that these agreements do not
constitute violations of the state or federal anti-trust laws.'
The normal purposes of the voluntary unit operation or
cooperative development plan are to increase the ultimate
recovery of oil and gas from the common source of supply
and to prevent the waste of oil and gas. The joint agreements are not designed to restrict the production of oil and
gas so hs to affect price structures by stiffening supply,
though some limitation due to good conservation practice
may be effected from a short range standpoint. The effect
of the unit agreement or the cooperative plan upon the production from a common source of supply is without a
significant effect upon the total production of oil or gas
in the particular state or in the United States.
An agreement between the lessors, lessees and royalty
owners within the unit area supersedes the express and
implied obligations extant under the terms of the oil and
gas leases upon properties located within the area. The
terms of the agreement should be reasonable, non-discriminatory and, of course, worthy of inducing the signatures of
the parties. The requirements of reasonableness and nondiscrimination assume great importance when one or more
of the lessors or royalty owners refuse to participate in the
plan, even though the greater number agree to the proposal.
4 Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New York,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
Virginia and West Virginia.
5 HARDwiCxE, op. ci. supra note 1, at 119-156. American Bar Association,
Proceedings of the Section on Mineral Law, Report of Committee on Conservation of Mineral Resources, 54 A.B.A. REP. 741-7 (1929).
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B. Voluntary Unit Operation in Those States Which
Have Statutes of Limited Authority Permitting
Voluntary Unit Operation or Cooperative
Development: 6
A few jurisdictions which do not specifically authorize the
execution of voluntary unit or cooperative plans by statute
permit these operations in instances where lands belonging
to the state are involved within the unit area. This permission may be coupled with a requirement that the approval
of the state regulatory agency be secured before putting the
program into effect. Plans initiated under the terms of these
statutes and approved by the regulatory agency are free
from prosecution under state anti-trust and monopoly statutes.
C. Voluntary Unit Operation in Those States Which
Have Statutes Expressly Permitting Voluntary
Unit Operation or Cooperative Development:
To remove those doubts which exist as to the application
of the state anti-trust and monopoly procedures to voluntary
plans of unit or cooperative development, a number of states
have enacted specific statutes authorizing the adoption, upon
a voluntary basis, of these plans and specifically exempting
them from the application of the state anti-trust laws.7
6

E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 93, § 102 (Jones Cum. Supp. Aug. 1951)

authorizes

unit or cooperative development of a producing or prospective petroleum field by
agreement when the Department of Finance finds it to be "in the best interest
of the State and of the production of petroleum. . . ." The purpose of the section
is to encourage unit plans of development upon state lands. It applies to units
which include state and private lands, but not to private lands alone. Indiana has
a similar statute. IND. ANN. STAT. tit. 46, § 1613 (Bums Cum. Supp. 1951). Illinois

and Indiana both have enacted statutes approving voluntary units under certain
conditions. See note 7 infra.
7

ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 179 (36)B, § 179 (36)E (Supp. 1947) authorizes

unit or cooperative development and requires the approval of the Alabama Oil
and Gas Board. ARiz. CODE ANN. c. 11, § 1330 (Cum. Supp. 1951)

approves unit

or cooperative development and requires the approval of the State Land Commissioner. ARx. STAT. AN. tit. 53, § 115-C (1947) was in point but was repealed
by AR. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 115-C-1 (Cum. Supp. 1951). Apparently the change

as made applies only to compulsory units formed under the 1951 law and not to
voluntary units. Ann. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 130 (1947)

permits voluntary agree-

ments for secondary recovery purposes and requires the approval of the Arkansas
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California and Kansas authorize voluntary agreements but
do not make specific exemptions from their state monopoly
acts."
In those statutes requiring a certain method of approval
of the unit or cooperative plan by a state regulatory agency,
those preparing and signing the agreement should do so in
strict compliance with the statutory requirement. These
Oil and Gas Commission. The Commission must find that the operation of the
pool under the agreement prevents waste. CoLo. STAT. ANN. c. 118, § 68 (12)
(Cum. Supp. 1951) authorizes unit or cooperative development with the approval
of the Colorado Oil and Gas Commission. The plan is to be offered to the
Commission, and if after hearing it is found the plan prevents waste, it is to be
adopted and approved. FiA. STAT. C. 377, §§ 28, 29 (1949) sanction unit or
cooperative development when approved by the Florida Board of Conservation.
GA. CooE ANN. tit. 43, § 717 (e) permits unit or cooperative development when
approved by the Georgia Oil and Gas Commission. Iux. STAT. ANN. c. 93, § 139
(1) (Jones Supp. Oct. 1951), authorizes agreements for unit or cooperative development when approved by the Illinois Department of Mines and Minerals. IND.
STAT. tit. 46, § 1714, (e) (Cum. Supp. 1951) permits unit or cooperative development when approved by the Department of Conservation. Miss. CoDE ANNr.
§ 6132-22(e) (Cum. Supp. 1950) authorizes agreements for unit or cooperative
development and requires that the Mississippi Oil and Gas Board approve such
agreements. O=I.A. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.15 (1951) states that no agreement
between or among lessees or other owners of oil and gas rights entered
into to bring about unit development violates the anti-trust and monopoly statutes of the state. While this section is found with the 1951 compulsory unit
operation statute, it is broad enough to cover all agreements rather than only
those entered into under compulsion. Tax. STAT., Ray. Civ. art. 6008b (Vernon
Supp. 1950) permits agreements subject to the approval of the Texas Railroad
Commission. Wash. Laws 1951, c. 146, §§ 35, 49, provides that persons may validly
integrate their lands to form a unit subject to the approval of the Washington
Oil and Gas Conservation Committee. No plan for this type operation violates
the anti-trust laws of the state. Wyo. Com. STAT. ANN. c. 57, § 1114 (Cum. Supp.
1951) authorizes agreements for unit or cooperative development subject to
approval by the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission.
8 CAL. Pus. Rxs. CODE § 3301 (Deering 1944) authorizes voluntary agreements
for cooperative or unit development with the approval of the Supervisor of Wells.
However, there is no anti-trust exemption. KAN. Gmr. STAT. ANN. c. 55, § 604(D)
(Corrick 1949) states that when it appears to the Kansas Corporation Commission
that those who have a right to drill and produce oil from any pool, prospective
pool, or part, have agreed upon a plan for the development of the pool, the
Commission, after notice and hearing, may approve the plan. This applies to oil
pools only. No specific anti-trust exemption is provided. N.M. STAT. ANN. c. 69,
§ 2131/ (e) (Cum. Supp. 1951) states that whenever the owners in any pool
have agreed upon a plan for the development or operation of such a pool, which
in the judgment of the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission has the effect
of preventing waste and which is fair to the royalty owners, the plan is to be
adopted by the Commission. The Commission, upon hearing and after notice, may
modify the plan to an extent necessary to prevent waste. The statute contains no
specific anti-trust exemption.
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statutes do not affect the express or implied conditions of an
oil and gas lease, nor the necessity of securing the approval
and subsequent signature of those who hold interests in the
oil and gas rights within the proposed area.
Many of the jurisdictions which authorize the formation
of voluntary plans of unit or cooperative development provide, either by the same or other enactments, that state
officials may participate in the agreement to bring about
the inclusion of state-owned lands in the unit area.
The lessees of land owned by the Federal Government
are authorized to act in the collective adoption of a unit
or cooperative development program for the further operation of a field or pool whenever the Secretary of the Interior
certifies that such a plan is necessary or advisable in the
public interest? The federal legislation had as one purpose
the removal of possible application of federal anti-trust
laws. Incidentally, doubt has been expressed as to whether
or not the act confers immunity upon holders of leases upon
private lands who voluntarily unite with federal lessees."
D. The Possibility of Using General Conservation
Statutes Authorizing Regulatory Agencies to
Prevent Waste In Protecting Those Participating
in Voluntary Unit Operations:
The modern conservation statute," with its basic requirement of waste prevention, presents a possible source of
9 60 STAT. 952, 30 U.S.C. § 226e (1946). See also HARowICxE, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 37 n.29, 156.
10 HARDwIcxE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 37-8.

11 TEx. STAT., RV.Civ. art. 6014(g) (Vernon 1948) negatived expressly any
intent in the act (the article defines waste) to require repressuring or unit operation. It has been argued that the Railroad Commission of Texas through the
issuance of an order may hut is not required to order unit or cooperative development. Walker, The Problem of the Small Tract Under Spacing Regulations, Oil
and Gas Journal, Aug. 11, 1938, p. 41. See also Hardwicke, Texas-1938, 1948 in
CONSERVATION OF OIL AND GAS, A LEGAL HISTORY 1948 447, 471-2 (Murphy
ed. 1949). THOmsoN, A SUmmARY OF THE STATUTES, THE RULES, REGULATIONS,
AND ORDERS, AND THE JUDICIAL DECISIONS WHICH PERTAIN TO PRESSURE MAINTENANCE AND RECYCLING 8 (Murphy ed. 1949), indicates that the Railroad Corn-

UNIT OPERATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS

protection in connection with the establishment of a voluntary unit or cooperative development plan. The regulatory
bodies are charged with a duty to prevent waste and they
may halt production in a field or pool where the operation
is wasteful. After determining that waste is present, the
agency has alternatives in its corrective action. It may close
in the field completely until the extravagant methods are
corrected, or more reasonably, it may recommend the adoption of conservation measures which will prevent waste,
and incorporate within its order administrative approbation
of voluntary plans acceptable to the owners of the oil and
gas rights.
The protection is much stronger in those states which
specifically authorize the administrative agency to regulate
secondary recovery methods which include cycling, pressure
maintenance and water flooding. The normal processes of
the voluntary unit or cooperative development plan call for
more than the unit management of the properties. These
plans envision a joint program to increase the ultimate recovery of oil and gas from the field or pool. The administrative agency in its regulation of the conservation program
may exercise control over the regimen of secondary recovery
and in that capacity give an administrative blessing to the
performance of voluntary plans.
The regulatory agency's approbation of a plan entered
into under its orders to prevent waste or to regulate secondary recovery would not give blanket immunity from antitrust suits to the participants. It is suggested, however, that
the persons participating in a unit or cooperative program
occupy a position of relatively greater immunity when they
are able to demonstrate that they entered into the plan with
the approval of the state agency or at its indirect request,
than are those persons who enter into the agreement without
mission of Texas has entered an order requiring repressuring. Railroad Commission of Texas, Sp. Order No. 3-6475 (July 14, 1944), for the Lake Creek Field,
Montgomery County, Texas.
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this administrative action. It is not suggested that the approval would extend its protection to plans which violate
state anti-trust or monopoly statutes in aspects beyond that
of a joint agreement to develop and operate the unit area.
For example, an agreement fixing resale prices for hydrocarbons separated from gas produced within the unit area
would receive no stamp of legitimacy from the agency
directive.
The Federal Government has indicated that it does not
consider the anti-trust statutes applicable to those practices,
adopted jointly, which are lawful operations essential to
conservation and waste prevention, where they have received the legitimate approval of the state administrative
authority.1 2
II.
The Voluntary Unit Agreement
A voluntary unit agreement may be formed between lessors, lessees and those persons who own interests in the oil
and gas rights within the unit area, or by lessees alone. It is
of interest to the future conduct of the operation that the
greatest number of those interested as lessors, lessees and
royalty owners join the agreement, since, by so doing, many
problems involving lease obligations and duties will be eliminated. In the event this happy sequence of signatures cannot
12 5 INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT Q. BULL. 8 (Dec. 1946). See also HARDWicxE,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 169-74; Ely, The Government in the Exercise of the Pow"
er Over Interstate Commerce in CONSERVATION OF O AND GAS, A LEGAL HISTORY
1948 634-6 (Murphy ed. 1949). Errebo, Unit Operation at Cotton Valley; An
L. Rv. 76 (1949). United
Alleged Violation of the Sherman Act, 24 TuLA.
States v. Cotton Valley Operators Committee, 75 F. Supp. I (W.D. La. 1948),
77 F. Supp. 409 (W.D. La. 1948), contains the rulings upon preliminary motions
in the case. The Cotton Valley case disappeared by dismissal because of the
failure of the Federal Government to produce documents, which included FBI
reports covering the investigation. 9 F.R.D. 719 (W.D. La. 1949), aff'd, 339 U.S.
940, 70 S. Ct. 793, 94 L. Ed. 1356 (1950), rehearing denied, 339 U.S. 972, 70 S. Ct.
994, 94 L. Ed. 1379 (1950). The Cotton Valley Field was unitized by the order
of Louisiana Department of Conservation, Order No. 10 as supplemented by
Order No. 10-C.
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be arranged, those persons who desire to participate may
still make an agreement.
The voluntary unit agreement is regulated by statute in
scope,"5 as well as in the requirements for approval of its
contents necessary to avoid the application of state antitrust and monopoly laws. 4
13 See note 7 supra. For a detailed analysis of the statutes, see Appendix,
Part 2, infra.
14 Many American oil-producing states have constitutional and/or statutory
provisions which govern monopolies, combinations and restraints of trade, the
sum total commonly referred to as anti-trust laws. ALA. CONST. Art. IV, § 103;
AL. CODE ANN. c. 57, §§ 106-108 (1940).'Ansz. CONST. Art. XIV, § 15; ARiz.
CODE ANN. c. 74 (1939). ARx. CONST. Art. II, § 19; ARx. STAT. ANN. tit. 70 (1947).
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600-16758 (1951) (No constitutional provision).
CoLO. STAT. ANN. c. 167, §§ 1-8 (1935) (No constitutional provision). FLA. STAT.
ANN. c. 542 (1949) (No constitutional provision). GA. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 2-2504 (No
appropriate statutory provision). IDAnO CONST. Art. XI, § 18; IDAuO CODE ANN.
fit. 48, §§ 101 et seq. (1949). ILL. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 22 and Art. XI, § 1; IL.
STAT. ANN. c. 15, § 62 (Jones 1947). IND. ANN. STAT. tit. 23 (Burns 1950) (No
constitutional provision). KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. c. 50 (Corrick 1949) (No constitutional provision). Ky. CoNsT. § 198 (No appropriate statutory provision).
LA. CoNsT. Art. 19, § 14; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, §§ 121-152 (West 1950).
MD. CoNsT. Art. 41 (No appropriate statutory provision). Mci.
STAT. ANN.
§§ 28.31-28.39, §§ 28.51-28.55 (1938). (No constitutional provision). Miss. CONST.
Art. VII, § 198; Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 1088-1108 (1942). Mo. REV. STAT. c. 416,
§ 010 (1949) (No constitutional provision). MONT. CoNsT. Art. XV, § 20; MONT..
Rav. CODES ANN. tit. 51, c. 1 (1947). NEB. Ry. STAT. c. 59 (1943) (No constitutional provision). N.M. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 38; N.M. STAT. ANN. c. 51,
§§ 1101-1108 (1941). N.Y. GEN. Busnsass LAW §§ 340-347 (No constitutional
provision). N.C. CoNsT. Art. I, § 31; N.C. GEN. STAT. c. 75 (1950). N.D. CoNsT.
§ 146; N.D. REv. CODE tit. 51, c. 08 (1943). OHio GEa. CODE ANN. §§ 6390-6402
(Page 1945). OxLA. CoNsT. Art. II, § 32, Art. V, § 51, Art. IX, §§ 41, 45, and
Art. XVIH, § 7; OKrA. STAT. tit. 79, §§ 1-37 (1951). In Oregon common law
rules govern in the absence of constitutional and statutory provisions. See, e.g.,
Schwab v. Moving Picture Mach. Operators Local, 165 Ore. 602, 109 P. (2d) 600,
607 (1941). Also in Pennsylvania, common law rules are applicable in the absence
of constitutional or statutory enactments. Nester v. Continental Brewing Co.,
161 Pa. 473, 29 AtI. 102, 104 (1894). S. C. CODE § 6620 (1942) (No appropriate
constitutional.provision). S.D. CoNsT. Art. XVII, § 20; S.D. CODE §§ 1801-1811
(1939). TENN. CoNsT. Art. I, § 22; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 5880-5891 (Williams
1934). T.
CoNsT. Art. I, § 26; Tax. STAT., REy. Civ. art. 7426 (Vernon, 1948).
UTAH CoNsT. Art. XII, § 20; UTAu REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, c. 1 (1933). VA.
CONST. § 165; VA. CODE fit. 59, § 3 (1950). WASH. CoNsT. Art. XII, § 22 (No
appropriate statutory provision). In West Virginia common law rules govern
in the absence of constitutional and statutory provisions. See, e.g., Slaughter v.
Thacker Coal & Coke Co., 55 W.Va. 642, 47 S.E. 247, 250-1 (1904). Wyo. CONST.
Art. I, § 30, Art. X, § 8; Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. c. 39, §§ 401 et seq. (1945).
For an excellent compilation of constitutional provisions, statutes and decisions
covering state anti-trust laws to 1940, the date of publication, see: STATE ANiiTRusT LAWS (1940) prepared by the Marketing Laws Survey, Works Progress
Administration.
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Many aspects of voluntary unit operation plans are similar to those in compulsory operating agreements. The time
or date the agreement is to be initiated could be the same
in both; the parties to make the proposals and participate
in the deliberations leading to the formation of a plan could
be identical; and there is no basic difference in the actual
drafting of the two agreements. With the exception of the
provisions of the compulsory plan based upon a statute and
designed to compel formation of the unit, the terms of the
voluntary plan cover the same integral parts as the compulsory plan.
In order to anticipate and provide for the most
important
contingencies, the draftsman should follow an exhaustive
check list "5 in preparing a voluntary unit agreement. He
should also bear in mind his responsibility to the contract
law as this agreement is a contractual obligation. The common law of contracts, as modified by statute, must be
strictly pursued. The execution or ratification of the agreement must be in such form as to entitle the instrument to
recordation in the appropriate office of the state in which
the unit area is located.
Great care should be exercised to include within the terms
of the initial basic agreement all those issues on which
agreement must be reached at a later date, and to cover
with sufficient exactitude those items which are presently
included but which may give rise to possible disagreement
or misinterpretation.
An agreement to which all of the lessors or royalty owners
do not affix their signatures adds further responsibility to
the draftsman's task. Its terms should be reasonable and
fair in order to avoid arbitrary discrimination against those
who reject the instrument.
15

For an illustrative check list, see Appendix, Part 1, infra.
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A. The Voluntary Unit Agreement, The Oil and Gas
Lease and Its Express and Implied Covenants: 16
Generally, no problem arises from the express or implied
covenants of the oil and gas lease where all the lessors,
lessees and royalty owners have joined voluntarily in the
plan of unit operation. The possibilities of a breach of the
covenants are limited in scope and the responsibility for a
breach is placed upon the unit rather than upon the lessee.
The significant situation arises where a lessor or royalty
owner is asked to participate in the voluntary plan and he
refuses to do so. In the jurisdictions where no compulsory
statutes exist, it is clear that the lessor or royalty owner
may not be forced to participate in the voluntary plan.
Those interested in the unit may desire to go ahead without
the dissident party; in that event legal results of importance
follow.
In Stott v. Tide Water Associated Oil Co.,1 7 the plaintiffs

leased their lands to the defendant who held other
leases covering 2215 of a total of 7355 acres of land above
a common source of wet gas. In 1939 recycling operations
were commenced by two other operators in the reservoir
and in December of that year the defendant adopted the
same technique. When the plaintiffs were invited to join the
proposed unit on the same terms offered royalty owners in
other tracts subject to defendant's leases, they refused. The
defendant conducted recycling operations upon its other
properties and continued to produce the wells on the plaintiffs' lands, although this production was limited, because
of the limited market for dry gas, and due to the conservation orders of the Railroad Commission of Texas prohibiting gas flaring.
16 MERML, COVENANTS IMPID 3N OIL AND GAS LEASES (2d ed. 1940, 1950
Supp.); Merrill, Unitization Problems: The Position of the Lessor, 1 OxsA. L.
REV. 119 (1948); Merrill, Implied Covenants, Conservation and Unitization, 2
ORLA. L. REV. 469 (1949); Merrill, Implied Covenants and Secondary Recovery,
4 OxLA. L. REV. 177 (1951).
17

68 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Tex. 1946).
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The recycling operations gradually extended the dry gas
area within the reservoir and the plaintiffs sued to recover
damages to the extent that the royalty fraction of condensate, which might have been removed from the wet gas
under their land, had been replaced by dry gas. The district
court found that the wet gas had been displaced under a
total of 33.9 of plaintiff's acres and gave judgment for the
plaintiffs. This was reversed in the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit,18 and certiorari was refused by the
United States Supreme Court. 9
The circuit court stated that the leases did not authorize
unit operation, that the plaintiffs could properly refuse to
participate in the plan. But the plaintiffs could not refuse
to cooperate with their lessee for the mutual protection of
both parties' interests in the adoption of a practicable and
customary plan which was offered universally in the area,
and at the same time demand damages. No breach of the
implied covenants in the leases was found; the plaintiffs'
contention, that an implied covenant "not to injure the
lessor's lease" existed, was found to have no standing in
the law.2 °
The circuit court noted 21 that since the plan offered was
"... reasonable and fair in all respects, the appellants amply
fulfilled any duty of fair dealing which may have been imposed upon them by the lessor-lessee relationship."
(To be concluded)
Blakely M. Murphy*
18 159 F. (2d) 174 (5th Cir. 1946).
19 331 U.S. 817, 67 S. Ct. 1306, 91 L.Ed. 1835 (1947).
20 159 F. (2d) at 177. But see Merrill, Unitization Problems: The Position
of the Lessor, 1 OK A. L. REv. 119, 128-35 (1948).
21 159 F. (2d) at 179.
* Attorney at law, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Counsel-Director, the Governor's Joint Committee on Reorganization of the State Government of Oklahoma;
Editor, Legal Report on Oil and Gas Conservation Activities; Secretary, The
Legal Committee of the Interstate Oil Compact Commission; Secretary, The
Committee on Publications, Section of Mineral Law, American Bar Association.
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APPENDIX
Part 1
The voluntary plan of unit operation must make provision for many
or, in some situations, all of the following elements and proposals:
1. Definitions of the following terms: unit, unit area, person, unit
production, lessee, royalty owner, separately owned tract, unit
operator, oil and gas, oil and gas rights, unit expense, secondary
recovery, costs of secondary recovery equipment, effective date
of the unit, the regulatory agency and the officials of the regulatory agency.
2. The name of the unit - it is common to combine the name of
the field with that of the common source of supply to form
the unit title.
3. The formation of the unit - the bringing together of the lessees' and the royalty owners' rights into the unit.
4. The effect of the formation of the unit. This factor includes:
(a) Clauses which unite the interests within the unit area as
though the area were within a single lease owned by the
lessees in undivided interests.
(b) Clauses which modify the terms of contracts, leases and
other instruments affecting the oil and gas rights.
(c) Provisions which effect or, perhaps, do not effect a transfer of title to tracts or leases within the unit.
(d) Clauses which provide that the portion of the unit pro-'
duction allocated to each tract be considered as production
from that tract.
(e) Agreements or stipulations in the plan which provide that
operations carried on under the agreement should be considered a fulfillment of the terms, covenants and conditions
of the leases and the contracts relating to the common
source of supply.
(f) Provisions which subject the unit production to ownership
in the proportions provided, subject to the requirement
that each lessee account for and pay to his royalty owners
for production as required under his leases and contracts.
5. Provisions for the allocation and disposal of the unit production.
6. Utilization of the unit production in unit operations.
LL.B., 1939, University of Arkansas; LL.M., 1944, University of Chicago. Member
Oklahoma Bar Association. Formerly, Editor, Drafting Subcommittee of the
Legal Committee, Interstate Oil Compact Commission. Editor, CoNsERvAT ro O
0L AND GAs, A LrGAL HiSTORy - 1948 (1949). Contributor, Arkansas Law
Review, Mississippi Law Journal, Tennessee Law Review, Tulane Law Review.
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7. Operating committee.
8. Unit operator.
9. Unit expense and cost of secondary recovery equipment.
10. Adjustment of investments in leases and operating equipment.
11. Lien of the unit operator.
12. Subsequent adjustments of investments in leases and operating
equipment.
13. Oil in lease tankage when the unit operator assumes control and
management.
14. The plan of operation.
15. The right to information regarding the unit operation.
16. Liabilities of the operating committee, individually or collectively,
and of the unit operators, the lessee and the lessors.
17. Changes of interest in ownership.
18. Accounting systems and audits.
19. Rights-of-way.
20. Claims, suits and judgments against individual lessees.
21. Title information respecting the tracts within the area.
22. Formations other than the common source of supply and the
rights of those to the agreement in such formations.
23. Abandonment of wells.
24. Abandonment of operations.
25. Amendments to the agreement by (a) mutual agreement or (b)
by reason of changes in the applicable laws, rules, regulations, and
orders of the state or Federal Government, or agencies of the
state or Federal Government.
26. Enlargement of the unit area.
27. The execution and ratification of the agreement by means of
counterparts.
28. The assumption of control and management of the unit area by
the unit operator.
29. Revisions of allocations within the unit plan and of the exhibits
with respect to allocations attached to the plan.
30. The effect of loss or failure of title.
31. A force majeure clause.
32. Signatures.

UNIT OPERATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS
Part 2
The scope of the voluntary unit agreement is best indicated by an
analysis, based upon similarities, of the various state statutory provisions. Since -these statutes have been cited in full in notes 7 and 8
supra, a repetition here would be bootless.
I. In Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Mississippi and
North Carolina, the agreement must be made - (a) in the interest of oil and gas conservation, and (b) to prevent waste. The
agreement must be between owners, operators, or owners and
operators, and royalty owners owning (1) separate holdings in
the same oil or gas pool, or (2) holdings in an area, or part
thereof, which appears from geological or other information to be
a common accumulation (common source of supply) of oil, gas,
or oil and gas. The agreement may provide for (a) unit operation,
or (b) cooperative development. The approval of the state regulatory agency is required to implement the agreement and to
exempt it from the state anti-trust and monopoly statutes. The
punctuation in all but the Mississippi statute would lead to the
belief that cooperative development alone is permitted. It seems
certain that either unit or cooperative development is intended.
The sections contain elements of ambiguity and might well be
redrafted and re-enacted for clarity.
II. In Arizona and Wyoming, the agreement is for (a) repressuring
or pressure maintenance, (b) cycling or recycling operations
which include extraction or separation of the liquid hydrocarbons from natural gas, or (c) for any other method of unit or
cooperative development. The agreement covers a field, pool,
or part thereof. The agreement requires the approval of the
state regulatory agency, after notice and a public hearing, as
being (a) in the public interest, (b) protective of correlative
rights, and (c) reasonably necessary to increase ultimate recovery or to prevent waste. The agreement binds only those who
execute the agreement, and their heirs, successors, assigns, and
legal representatives. Specific exemption from the anti-trust laws
is provided in the Arizona and Wyoming statutes.
IIA. In Colorado, the requirements of II are applicable and, in
addition, those agreements which were entered into prior to
1951 are validated. The agreement must be approved by the
Colorado Oil and Gas Commission, upon notice and after hearing, if it prevents waste as defined in the Act, and if the
producers (or a producer if but one) have agreed or adopted
a plan for the development and operation of the pool or field.
The requirements of the Act do not apply to any lands committed to a unit or cooperative development agreement ap-
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proved by the Secretary of the Interior. Specific anti-trust
provisions are also provided.
III. The 1939 Arkansas enactment was a type I statute. The enactment now in effect provides that persons owning and operating any oil pool, or a portion thereof, may enter into an
agreement for the employment of secondary recovery methods
for the production of oil, and if the regulatory agency finds
that the operation of the area results in the prevention of
waste, the state anti-trust and monopoly statutes are waived.
IV. To be valid in California, the agreement must be aimed at the
protection of oil and gas from unreasonable waste. The agreement is between the lessors, lessees, operators, or others owning
or controlling royalty or other interests in the separate properties of a producing or prospective oil or gas field. The agreement
is to be (a) for the cooperative development and operation of
all or a part of the field, (b) for the unit operation or development of all or a part of the field, (c) for the purpose of fixing
the time, location, and manner of drilling and operating wells
for the production of oil or gas, or (d) for the purpose of
providing for the return of gas into the earth for storage or
repressuring of an oil or gas field. The approval of the Supervisor of Wells is required. He must also make certain findings.
The agreement binds the successors and assigns of those who
sign and may be enforced by specific performance.
V. When it is shown to the Kansas Corporation Commission that
those who have a right to drill into and to produce oil from a
pool or part of a pool, or a prospective pool within Kansas have
agreed upon a plan for the development of the pool, a part
thereof, or a prospective pool, or for the distribution of the
allowed production therefrom, the Kansas Corporation Commission may, after notice and upon hearing, approve the plan
or distribution.
VI. When it is shown to the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission that the owners in any pool have agreed upon a plan
for the development and operation of the pool, or upon a plan
for the distribution of the pool's allowable, the Commission
will adopt the plan when, in its judgment, the plan prevents
waste and is fair to the royalty owners. After notice and hearing
the Commission may modify the plan to any further extent
necessary to prevent waste.
VII. An agreement in Oklahoma, between lessees or other owners
of oil and gas rights in oil and gas properties for the purposes
of unit development and operation of such properties, does not
violate the laws which relate to trusts, combinations, and
monopolies.
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VIII. The agreement in Texas must be between (a) persons owning
or (b) persons controlling the production, leases, royalties,
or other interests in separate properties in the same oil field,
gas field, or oil and gas field. The agreement may be for
these purposes: (a) to establish pooled units necessary to
effect secondary recovery operations for oil and gas including
cycling, recycling, repressuring, water flooding, pressure
maintenance, and to establish and operate the needed cooperative facilities; and (b) to establish pooled units and
cooperative facilities for the conservation and utilization of
gas, including extraction and separation of the hydrocarbons
from the natural gas or casing-head gas and returning the
dry gas to a formation underlying the lands and leases committed to the agreement.
The Texas Railroad Commission must find, after notice and
upon a hearing, that (a) the agreement is necessary to accomplish the purposes for which it is made, (b) it is in the
interest of the public welfare as reasonably necessary to
prevent waste, and to promote the conservation of oil, gas,
or oil and gas, and (c) the rights of the owners of all the
interests in the field, whether signers or not of the unit
agreement, are protected under its operation, (d) the estimated added cost of such operation does not exceed the
value of the added recoveries of oil and gas by operations
under the agreement for or on behalf of the persons affected
including royalty owners, overriding owners, oil and gas
payment owners, carried interest owners, lien claimants and
others as well as the lessees, (e) the other available or
existing methods or facilities for secondary recovery operations, conservation and utilization of gas in the field or area,
or methods or facilities for the conservation and utilization
of gas in the field or area are inadequate for such purposes,
(f) the area covered by the unit agreement contains only
such part of the field as has reasonably been defined by
development, and (g) the owners of interests in the oil and
gas under each tract of land within the area are given an
opportunity to participate in the unit upon the same "yardstick basis" as the owners of the oil and gas interests in
other tracts.
The agreement may provide for (a) the location and spacing
of input wells, (b) the extension of leases covering any part
of the lands committed to the unit so long as operations
for drilling or reworking are conducted upon the unit, or
so long as production of oil and gas in paying quantities is
had from any part of the lands or leases committed to the
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unit. However, the agreement does not relieve the operator
from the obligation to develop reasonably the lands and
leases as a whole which are committed to the unit.
The agreement does not bind any person other than one
signing the agreement and his successors. No person is compelled or required to sign an agreement.
The Railroad Commission of Texas is to disapprove the
agreement where it finds that the area described in the unit
agreement is insufficient, or that it covers more acreage
than is necessary to accomplish the purposes of the law.
Agreements so executed are subject to the valid orders, rules,
and regulations of the Commission which relate to location,
spacing, proration, conservation, or matters within its authority (whether adopted before or after the agreement), and
no agreement may contain the field rules for the area or
field, that being the sole right of the Commission.
The agreement may not provide for: (a) a limitation of
production of oil and gas from the unit property, this being
left to the Commission; (b) for the cooperative refining of
crude petroleum, distillate, condensate, or gas, or any byproduct, except that the extraction of liquid hydrocarbons
from gas and their separation into propanes, butanes, ethanes,
distillate, condensate, or natural gasoline without added
processing is not refining; or (c) the cooperative marketing
of crude petroleum condensate, distillate, gas, or by-products
thereof.
No approval is required of the Commission for the joint
development of jointly owned properties by voluntary agreement. No rights which a person enjoys to make and to
enter into unit and pooling agreements is affected. The approval of an agreement is not to be construed as a finding
that operations of a different kind or character in any part
of the field not within the unit are wasteful or not in the
interest of conservation. An agreement so approved does not
violate the state laws as to anti-trust schemes and monopolies.
IX. In Washington, persons owning interests in separate tracts of
land may" integrate their interests and manage, operate and
develop such lands as a unit, subject to the approval of the
Washington Oil and Gas Committee. No plan as approved
violates anti-trust statutes.

